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I. INTRODUCTION
The contractual transmission of know-how is currently one of
the most important means of transferring technology, particularly
for developing countries. The definition and legal nature of know-
how, as well as the validity of agreements and conditions for its
transfer, present a number of complex substantive issues. Those
issues have received a wide range of treatment under different
systems of law and in different countries. Not surprisingly, con-
siderable uncertainty exists as to the degree of protection, if any,
recognized for know-how and of the effects of agreements for its
transfer. This article reviews current ideas on know-how in light
of particular interests and needs of developing countries. Due to
the lack of a comprehensive legal approach to the matter in such
countries, the analysis does not exhaust itself in de lege lata con-
siderations, but attempts to provide criteria for possible
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legislative action, as well as guidelines for improving the negotia-
tion of agreements for the transfer of know-how.
At the outset, the importance of transfer of know-how in
developed and developing countries and certain characteristics of
such a transfer are described. This discussion is useful for the
legal analysis undertaken later. Definitions ascribed to know-how
under different national laws a'nd the principal theories on the
legal nature of know-how are then discussed. With information as
to the legal nature, classification, and validity of agreements for
the communication of know-how as background, the effects and
treatment of certain terms and conditions involving secret know-
how are analyzed. Conclusions are presented in a final section.
Throughout the article, special attention is given to background
information, legislation, and doctrine existing in Latin America,
which, as a region, is one of the major importers of technology in
the developing world.
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSFER OF KNOW-HOW
There is a substantial lack of statistics regarding the dimension
of international trade in know-how. However, its share in such
trade is likely to be important, as is its role as a part of the
technological assets of modern enterprises. Preliminary informa-
tion presented below suggests that know-how is a major compo-
nent of transfer of technology, particularly to developing coun-
tries.
A. Importance of Know-how Transfers for Developed Countries
The importance of know-how in transfer of technology within
the European Economic Community (EEC) has been recognized by
the EEC Commission, with particular reference to know-how that
is ancillary to licensed patents. The preamble to the Commission's
1976 proposal for a block exemption regulation for patent licenses
stated:
It is consistent to extend this regulation to patent licensing
agreements containing ancillary provisions concerning the
assignment of the right to use of secret manufacturing processes
or knowledge relating to the use or the application of industrial
technology, as in practice, licensing agreements are hardly ever
concluded without such ancillary provisions.'
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Commission Regulation on
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The wording was altered in the 1979 version of the proposal,2
although the motivation for the change is not clear. On one hand,
the new text explicitly refers to "know-how." Conversely, the last
clause is weakened by its indication that "in practice patent licens-
ing agreements with such ancillary provisions are very frequent."3
On the basis of 3,500 agreements reported to the Commission in ac-
cordance with Regulation No. 17' during 1962 to 1970, a Commission
survey established that five percent of such agreements involved
know-how only, and sixty-two percent included know-how in com-
bination with patents or trademarks or both.' A subsequent study on
licensing, conducted by a group of European industrialists,' sug-
gested that the relative share of agreements including know-how
was higher than that indicated by the Commission figures. This
study, based on analyses of 4,302 licenses granted by eight large
European companies, determined that more than ten percent of
such agreements involved know-how alone, and that more than
half included know-how associated with patents, trademarks, or
both.7
With regard to United States transfer of know-how abroad, it
was estimated in 1977 that the receipts credited to the United
States amounted to one billion dollars annually." Despite the lack
of precise and conclusive evidence in the United States and other
developed countries, it is clear that trade in know-how is very
large and is likely to comprise an important portion of receipts in
technology transfers from industrialized countries.9
B. Evidence in Developing Countries
Available information originating in certain Latin American
the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing
Agreements (1976), EUR. COMM. Doc. No. IV/1 34/76-E, reprinted in B. CAWTHRA, PATENT
LICENSING IN EUROPE 136 (1978).
22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 (1979).
8 Id. at 13.
5 J. 0. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
Paper presented by W. Schlieder, Director-General for Competition of the European
Communities Commission, at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Licensing Executives
Society (October 19-22, 1971), reprinted in part in B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 132-33.
' In 1972, the Industrial Property Committee of the Council of Industrial Federations of
Europe, consisting of representatives from fourteen European countries, set up a group to
study licensing matters. B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 88.
Id at 103-34.
Know-how Licensing and the Anti-trust Laws Revisited, paper presented by D. Mac-
Donald at the Annual Conference of the Licensing Executives Society, London (June 1-3,
1977). See also L. EKSTROM, LICENSING IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS (3d ed. 1964).
' See B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 130-69.
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countries confirms the growing importance of know-how as a com-
ponent of international transfer of technology. For example, in
Argentina, in 1972, agreements including both "confidential
knowledge" and industrial property rights accounted for seventy
percent of the payments originating in agreements registered by
the national authority. Although contracts including only in-
dustrial property rights were of relatively little importance, fifty
percent of total payments by national technology recipienis (ex-
cluding foreign subsidiaries) were based on the transfer of "con-
fidential knowledge" as the sole object of the contract.10
Imported technology in Brazil is characterized by its non-
proprietary nature. Only one percent of total payments approved
by the Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial (INPI) be-
tween 1972 and June 1975 was represented by the license of in-
dustrial property rights. The remainder, defined by INPI as
"technical assistance," included the furnishing of production pro-
cesses, formulae, technical data, product specifications, models,
molds, and matrices.1 The Brazilian example is illustrative of the
trend toward the relative decline of industrial property as a com-
ponent of technology transfer. Although from 1957 to 1961 in-
dustrial property represented more than forty-four percent of
total payments remitted, the percentage has dropped drastically
since then, amounting to only four and one-half percent in
1972-1974. At the same time, the inclusion of "technical
assistance" grew from fifty-five percent to more than ninety-five
percent. 2
In Colombia, twenty-two of 720 agreements considered by the
Comit6 de Regalias during 1967-1977 contained a license of pat-
ents only; 219 agreements implemented the provision of "technical
assistance.""3 A combination of industrial property rights and
"technical assistance" accounted for more than forty-eight percent
of such agreements. When contracts in force in 1977 are con-
sidered, percentage distribution varies significantly; no agree-
ments related exclusively with patent rights had been maintained
in force, while the percentage of contracts combining industrial
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE TECNOLOGIA INDUSTRIAL DE ARGENTINA, ASPECTOS ECONOMICOS
DE LA IMPORTACION DE TECHNOLOGIA EN LA ARGENTINA EN 1972 at 31 (1974).
1 S. FUNG & J. CASSIOLATo, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL
THROUGH AGREEMENTS: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION 65 (1976).
12 A. FIGUEIRA BARBOSA, PROPRIEDADE E QUASI-PROPRIEDADE NO COMERCO DE TECNOLOGIA
table 37 (n.d.).
1S This expression seems to include the transmission of know-how.
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property and "technical assistance" rose to more than sixty-one
percent. 1
4
In Ecuador, data for 1978 indicate that almost eleven percent of
registered agreements consisted exclusively of know-how and/or
technical assistance, while eighty-seven percent corresponded to
these elements in association with patents and trademarks. The
remainder was one agreement including patents and trademarks. 5
In Peru, more than seventy percent of agreements registered in
1975 included (as the sole supply or in association with other
elements) the communication of "technical information." This
percentage is similar to the proportion of agreements including
patents (69.6%) and trademarks (71%).18
In sum, the data presented above suggest that (1) a major part
of transfer of technology agreements entered into by Latin
American enterprises in the countries considered, include, solely
or as one of their elements, the transfer of know-how under
various modalities; (2) the practice of "packaging" a number of
technological items seems to prevail in present contracting pat-
terns, notwithstanding the application of governmental measures
for the control of transfer of technology;17 and (3) trends identified
in some Latin American countries (primarily Brazil) indicate that
industrial property has a declining role in technology transfer, at
the expense of the transmission of unpatented technologies
through various forms. In connection with this last conclusion, it is
worthwhile to note that in many Latin American countries there
is'very slow growth in the annual number of patent applications
(e.g. Bolivia and Ecuador), while in others (e.g. Argentina, Colombia,
Peru, and Mexico) there are clear signs of a decline in absolute
terms thereof during the last decade. Brazil is one of the few
Latin American nations where patent applications increased dur-
ing the period for which information is available. 8
SECRETARIA T9CNICA DEL COMIT]k DE REGALIAS DE COLOMBIA, RECUENTO DE LAS LABORES
DEL COMITt DE REGALIAS DE COLOMBIA 1967-1977 at 15 (1977).
11 Instituto para la Integracion de Amdrica Latina (INTAL), Perfil de la Demanda de Tec-
nologiA en el Ecuador (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
" See INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACION TECNOL6GICA INDUSTRIAL Y DE NORMAS T9CNICAS
(ITINTEC), EFECTO DEL PROCESO DE IMPORTACtON DE TECNOLOGIA 21 (1974).
"7 See text accompanying footnote 21 infra.
" Patent applications by nonresidents in Brazil increased from 5,493 in 1972 to 7,585 in
the year 1974. During the same period applications decreased by 502 in Argentina, by 290
in Colombia, and by 464 in Venezuela. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PRO-
PRIETE INDUSTRIELLE (1976).
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS ON KNOW-HOW IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. Relative importance of know-how vis-a-vis patented
technology
The previous section demonstrates that in Latin America know-
how and other unpatented technologies are more important, as a
component of transfer of technology agreements, than patented
techniques. Available information suggests that the relative im-
portance of unpatented technologies in that area is higher than in
the case of developed countries. It would also be possible to find
significant differences in this respect according to the industrial
sector concerned. For instance, agreements related to the phar-
maceutical sector are likely to be more intensive in industrial
property rights than are agreements in textiles.
The higher significance of know-how and other unpatented
technologies vis-a-vis patents in developing countries as compared
to their significance in industrialized countries, is due to a
multiplicity of factual and institutional circumstances. Among the
former, it is possible to mention the technological capacity of the
potential recipient. Enterprises in developing countries frequently
lack the technical skills and infrastructure needed to introduce
new processes and products. Technology transfer in this context
often involves a set of supplies and services, including technical
information (process description, formulae, instructions, etc.),
training at supplying parties' plants, technical assistance, quality
control methods, and so on. In the case of "turn key" projects, in
particular, the place of patented technology, if any, is minimized
by the weight of other components.
Among the institutional factors, the trend to limit or eliminate
patentability in certain economic fields should be noted. This
trend has been particularly clear in Latin America, principally
with regard to pharmaceuticals, food, and certain strategic
materials."9 At the same time, many Latin American countries
have designed special policies or imposed restrictions on licenses
of foreign trademarks."°
11 In connection with current trends on patentability in pharmaceuticals, see White, La
Industria Farmacdutica Internaciona" La Legislaci6n Comparada sobre Patentes y el Caso
Argentino, REVISTA DEL DERECHO INDUSTRIAL (1979).
' See Correa, Main Issues in the Regulation of Licence Arrangements on Foreign
Trademarks: The Latin American Experience, 7 WORLD DEv. 705 (1979).
1981]
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B. Know-how as a part of a global package
Figures presented above demonstrate that "packaging" prac-
tices are applied widely in technology transfer to Latin America.
Accordingly, various governments have proposed policies aimed
specifically at promoting the unbundling of technology trans-
actions. However, with the possible exception of Brazil, where
parties must conclude separate agreements according to contrac-
tual categories defined by existing regulations, such policies have
not been applied systematically." Given the limited role of patent
licenses, the inclusion of know-how as a part of global packages
should not be attributed primarily to the accessory nature of
know-how with regard to patented inventions, but rather to the
predominant modalities of negotiation of technology transfer in
developing countries. The need to unpackage technology transfers
is generally founded on three main objectives: (1) to determine
the price charged for each item of the transaction; (2) to allow the
maximum possible participation of local sources of goods and
technology; and (3) to facilitate the absorption of transferred
technologies.
As a result of the low technological capacity of the recipient,
"know-how" usually is comprised of technical skills (tours de main)
and experience, instructions for process application, and all other
information necessary for putting into operation the technology
transferred. Its transmission often includes, in addition to the pro-
vision of written information, personal services of the supplier's
technicians, as well as instruction of the recipient's personnel at
the supplier's plant.
Notwithstanding the complex nature, characteristics, and forms
of transmission of items referred to, it is common, in practice, that
the acquiring party be bound with respect to the "proprietary
nature" or "confidential character" of information transferred.
Such clauses are generally drafted in very broad terms, encom-
passing all non-patented knowledge. Although the legitimacy of
confidentiality clauses cannot be questioned, in principle, when
they apply to actual secret information,' the same does not apply
to other knowledge and experiences that do not constitute trade
secrets or secret industriel.
Therefore, when negotiating transfer of technology agreements
": See C. CORREA, REGIMENES DE CONTROL DE LA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA EN
AM2:RICA LATINA 47 (1979).
' See text accompanying footnote 118 infra.
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including "know-how," the acquiring party should require the sup-
plying party to identify the specific pieces of information that are
to be considered subject to an obligation of confidentiality, as
distinguished from information that is public knowledge. A clear
distinction will allow a more precise evaluation of price, as well as
facilitate the determination of the legal treatment and contractual
conditions applicable to each category of information.
IV. DEFINITION OF KNOW-HOW
The definition of "know-how" is a most controversial issue. In
the absence of a legal concept, authors, international organiza-
tions, and other entities have proposed very different theories of
identification. For some, know-how should be synonymous with
"trade secret." Others hold that secrecy is not the decisive element.
Alternatively, some scholars include commercial information
related to the operation of an enterprise, while others limit the
concept of know-how to technical knowledge that is applied in in-
dustry. Further divergence arises on the issues of whether "know-
how" involves personal technical skills (tours de main) and
technical experience, or consists exclusively of technical adapta-
tions and adjustments. Some authors are reluctant to formulate a
definition."
Certainly, the preceding does not exhaust the field of existing
conceptual differences on the definition of know-how. While a
definition is difficult even within the context of a single national
law,' the task is further complicated when there is an attempt to
provide a universal definition of know-how. As warned by Gomez
Segade:
One should not attempt to define know-how in a valid universal
sense, but its definition and limits should be left to the national
legislatures. A uniform definition of know-how could prejudice
those countries which are fundamentally recipients of know-how
(underdeveloped nations) to the benefit of the wealthier coun-
tries which are those who habitually export the know-how. 5
,3 This is the position of J. GOMEZ SEGADE, EL SECRETO INDUSTRIAL (KNOW-HOW): CONCEPTO
Y PROTECCION 132 (1974). Consider the position adopted by the International Association for
the Protection on Industrial Property (AIPPI), in ANNUARIES DE LASSOCIATION INTERNA-
TIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 620 (1970).
U With respect to United States law, see F. DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF
KNOW-HOW IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1976).
25 J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23, at 132.
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Indeed, the expression "know-how" as such has received limited
acceptance in the legislatures of developed or developing coun-
tries. Examples of it use can be found in fiscal regulations, such as
in Revenue Procedure 69-19 of the United States Internal
Revenue Services as well as in Colombian legislation.' However,
the term has been employed in judicial decisions of some coun-
tries, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom,
where it has been used expressis verbis in certain decisions.2"
A. Know-how under United States law
United States authors and jurisprudes unanimously agree on
the assimilation of "know-how" and "trade secrets," that is, a set
of secret techniques and information, including those of a commer-
cial nature, used in an enterprise.' In accordance with the
analytical definition provided by the Restatement of the Law of
Torts, "a trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it."' In addition, the Restatement
lists certain factors to be considered in determining the existence
of a trade secret. These are the following:
i) the extent to which the information is known out-
side the business to which it refers;
ii) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in the business;
iii) the extent of measures taken by the owner to
guard the secrecy of the information;
iv) the value of the information to the owner and his
competitors;
v) the amount of effort or money expended by him
in developing the information; and
Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301 (providing procedures to determine whether an agree-
ment to furnish "know-how" in exchange for stock is a transfer of property under I.R.C. § 351).
" Colombian Decree No. 2123 (1975).
" See F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 19-48. For a review of United States judicial
decisions regarding know-how, see A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 32-37 (1962).
For a review of French and German judicial decisions regarding know-how, see J. GOMEZ
SEGADE, supra note 23, at 135.
' For qualifications applicable to this definition, see F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at
29-33.
w RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Section 757 was deleted from the sec-
ond edition of the Restatement. The editors believed that the influence of tort law on trade
practices had decreased, replaced by new unfair trade regulations. 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS 1 (1979).
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vi) the ease of difficulty with which the informa-
tion could properly be acquired or duplicated by
others.'
Although the definition previously mentioned is restrictive with
regard to the objects that are susceptible of being considered as
"trade secrets," it extends to information of a commercial
character. By contrast, statutes adopted by many States between
1964 and 1969, which were based upon an earlier New Jersey
law,3" excluded commercial secrets from their protection. The
New Jersey statute provided:
The term secret means the whole or any portion or phase of any
scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure,
formula or improvement which is secret and of value; and a
trade secret shall be presumed to be secret when the owner
thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to
persons other than those selected by the owner to have access
thereto for limited purposes."
B. Know-how under French law
In the first French judicial decision in which the term "know-
how" was used, the Court of Appeals of Douai defined it as non-
patentable "techniques of application and process of minor impor-
tance."' In another decision, the same court described know-how
as "a package of secret technical information" concerning the ap-
plication of a process, and stated that such information must in-
volve "a certain quality of novelty and originality."' Although
various French commentators consider novelty and secrecy as
essential characteristics of know-how,, others admit its existence
without such requisites.37 According to Magnin, know-how is, in
general terms, "a means of manufacture." 3
o' RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939).
New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2A:119-5.2 (West 1969). This statute was repealed in 1978.
New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C: 98-2 (West Sup. 1980).
" I& § 2(a): 119-5.2(c) (West 1969).
", Judgment of March 16, 1967, Cour d'appel, Douai, [1967], cited in F. MAGNIN, KNOW-
HOW ET PROPRItT9 INDUSTRIELLE 29 (1973).
Judgment of May 2, 1969, Cour d'appel, Douai, [1969], cited in F. MAGNIN, supra note
34, at 30.
P. Durand, Le Know-how, [1967] J.C.P. I No. 2078.
" P. Math~ly, Summary Report, AIPPI (1972).
U F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 94.
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C. Know-how under United Kingdom law
According to Turner,39 the words "know-how" are used to
describe means which are not so definite as to be called a process.
Nonetheless, they frequently apply to complicated and definite
processes. In a more restrictive sense, "know-how is sometimes
used in England .. .to mean the acquired skill and accumulated
experience of a technician which are inseparable from him and are
in fact his technical value to an employer. ' 4 A similar interpreta-
tion was followed by the Master of Rolls in Stevenson, Jordan,
and Harrison, Ltd. v. MacDonald and Evans."
D. Know-how under European Economic Commuinity law
The EC Commission's Communication of December 24, 1962
referred to know-how as "knowledge acquired in the development
of an invention" and to the "inventions unprotected by the law
which improve a technique."'2 More recently, the proposal for a
block exemption regulation for patent licenses, as revised and
published in 1979, was intended to cover "ancillary provisions con-
cerning the assignment of the right of use of secret manufacturing
processes or know-how related to the use or application of in-
dustrial technology. ' 3
The concept emerging from this quotation is noteworthy in
three respects. First, the know-how described therein is ancillary
to licensed patents. Second, it is of a secret nature. Third, it com-
prises process or knowledge related to industrial technology, i.e.,
it excludes commercial information as well as that related to
economic activities other than industry.
E. Know-how in Latin America
The consideration of know-how is new in Latin America. Since
the degree of local industrial innovation is limited and concen-
trated in the few relatively industrialized countries in the region,
it is not surprising to observe that the treatment of such an issue
has focused on those aspects concerning the transfer of know-how
rather than on the question of its definition and protection. There
are, however, significant exceptions.
n A. TURNER, supra note 28, at 17.
,0 1d.
' [1951] 68 Reports of Patent Cases 190.
'2 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2922-23 (1962).
, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 13 (1979).
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On one hand, a 1971 Peruvian decree" established a set of rules
aimed at protecting unpatented technological knowledge. The
decree applies if the knowledge is secret, the holder has taken
necessary measures for preserving its secret character, and the
knowledge is actually novel. Articles 87 and 88 of the decree pro-
vide:
All technological knowledge integrated by manufacturing and
general production processes, and the knowledge relevant to the
utilization and application of industrial techniques, resulting
from knowledge, experience, or intellectual ability, is suscepti-
ble to protection as Industrial Property when it constitutes a
secret, be it of the author or of the concern. Not to be protected
as Industrial Property are manual abilities or personal ap-
titudes, be they of one or several workers. The State will pro-
tect the owner (title-holder) of the technological process against
its illicit use, disclosure, communication, or expropriation, as
long as the necessary measures have been taken to preserve its
secret character and the processes themselves are actually
novel.45
On the other hand, a 1975 Colombian decree has attempted a
definition of "know-how" - for fiscal purposes - as follows:
Know-how is to be understood as the secret experience concern-
ing the manner of doing something, accumulated (compiled) in a
state of art or technology and susceptible of application in the
same technological branch in an efficient manner. 6
Among the elements contained in this concept, it is worthwhile to
stress that it (1) only refers to accumulated "experience"; (2) is
not limited to any particular economic sector; and (3) includes an
"efficient" application as an element of the definition. This last
condition certainly constitutes an original feature, but it is logically
inadequate to include the mode of application as a factor qualify-
ing the object which is to be defined.
Finally, authors that have considered the problem of definition
seem to exclude secrecy as a determinative characteristic of
know-how. According to Aracama Zorraquin, "know-how, as
such, consists of practical knowledge of how to realize, in a com-
mercially competitive manner, certain industrial processes." 7 Le
" Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 007-71-1C (1971).
Id at arts. 87 & 88.
" Colombian Decree No. 2123 (1975).
,7 E. Aracama Zorraquin, El Know-how T~cnico. Tentativa de Sistemitica Juridica (1969)
1981]
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Pera also rejects the equation identification of know-how and
trade secret. He argues that in commercial practice what is
transferred under the name of know-how is not only secret
knowledge, but also other information, the acquisition of which
represents an advantage for the recipient in addition to the saving
of money and time."
F. Know-how under Yugoslav law
Recent Yugoslav law formulates the definition of know-how in
very broad terms. It includes secret and non-secret knowledge ap-
plicable to industrial and other production, as well as to program-
ming, maintenance of commodities, and market research.'9 Article
22 of the recent law reads as follows:
Within the meaning of the present law, know-how shall cover
the entire range of modern technical and technological know-
how and experience and skills, including those which pertain to
specifications of raw materials, standards of manufacture and
processing, process techniques and the secrets of one's own pro-
cedures, quality control and other data which may be applied in
industrial and other production. Know-how also consists in infor-
mation and instructions as to programming, manufacture, use
and maintenance of products, and may also include the
methodology of market research.50
G. Elements for a definition of know-how
The preceding analysis suggests the difficulties posed by any
attempt to formulate a universal definition of know-how.
As noted previously, the analysis of know-how issues in develop-
ing countries is influenced strongly by their dependence upon
foreign technologies and by the characteristics of technology trans-
fer to such countries. The examination of know-how should not ig-
nore such peculiarities, but rather should take into account the
(unpublished thesis), quoted in Plate & Boglino, Know-how, 12 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COM-
ERCIAL Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 70-71 (1980).
" S. LE PERA, CUESTIONES DE DERECHO COMERCIAL MODERNO (1974). However, in an
Argentine judicial decision, a court outlined the secret character of know-how, in stating
that know-how consists of "secretos industriales, habilidades o modos de hacer que integran
el patrimonio de la empresa." CAMARA NACIONAL CIviL, LA LEY 771 (1966).
" Yugoslavian Law on long-term Cooperation in Production, Commercial-Technical
Cooperation and the Awarding and Acquiring of Technology Between Organizations of
Associated Labor and Foreign Persons (Law on Transfer of Technology), reprinted in 18
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 249 (1979).
Ii Quoting YUGOSLOVENSKA STVARNOST 17 (1979).
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particular conditions where the use and transfer of know-how take
place. In this sense and at this stage, it is vital for developing
countries to formulate an adequate set of principles and rules for
regulating the transfer and subsequent use of unpatented
technologies that have been generated abroad. This approach
should not lead, however, to the neglect of other issues related to
the "protection" of know-how as an asset of the enterprise that has
discovered or developed it.
Bearing in mind these considerations, know-how can be described
as the method of manufacture or the technical knowledge relating
to the use and application of industrial technologies.5 The main
elements of this definition are discussed below.
1. Knowledge related to industrial application
Know-how comprises knowledge susceptible of industrial ap-
plication and excludes techniques of a nonindustrial character.52
G6mez Segade has indicated that the inclusion of nonindustrial in-
formation in the concept of know-how is contrary to the interests
of developing countries in that these countries may be forced to
pay for it and technical knowledge. Gbmez Segade advances the
following three arguments in support of the exclusion of nonin-
dustrial or commercial information:
First, the use of the term 'commercial knowledge' signifies a
departure from the scheme of 'know-how' which originated with
the final object of designating solely technical knowledge and
precisely that which was necessary to gain a better exploitation
of patent use. Second, the inclusion of commerical knowledge
within the concept of know-how dilutes the protection of the on-
ly know-how with authentic value, which is that of technical-
industrial data. Third, it is important to underscore that con-
tracts of supply (contracts to give information) or licenses for
know-how in the strictest sense have as objects only those
technological bits of knowledge. Those are the only ones which
truly interest the purchasers because they are valid as to all ap-
plications since applied technology is universal. On the other
hand, commerical data or organizational skills are not universal-
ly valid-they depend on economic circumstances, idiosyncra-
cies, and sociological differences which vary noticeably from one
51 This description is not necessarily the correct one, but is appropriate for purposes of
this study.
52 For a suggestion of similar limitations on the concept of know-how, see F.
DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 49-50. See also J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23, at 144-48;
F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 93.
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region to another and from one country to another. Thus, for ex-
ample, a publishing scheme may prove efficient in the United
States and yet could result in inefficiency to an African or In-
donesian consumer.
2. Secret and non-secret information
The definition includes both secret and non-secret information.
A majority of authors consider secrecy an essential requisite of
know-how. However, it is necessary to distinguish the elements of
know-how from those required for conferring upon it a certain
kind of protection. Although secrecy is certainly a condition for
the validity of confidentiality obligations or the application of un-
fair competition law, it is not necessary for the classification of
certain knowledge as know-how.
In many instances, recipient enterprises are interested in pay-
ing for the transfer of non-secret knowledge, which may be
beyond the capability of available personnel. For example, the
gathering of such non-secret knowledge might indicate the start of
an important investment program. In this situation, however, the
nature of obligations undertaken by the recipient should differ
radically from obligations applicable when the reason for the con-
tract is the disclosure of secret information.'
3. Other elements
The concept proposed herein is not restrictive as to the type of
knowledge that may be deemed to be know-how, whether em-
pirically accumulated or systematically developed. It is indifferent
as to whether the information constitutes "the entire manufactur-
ing process" or separable pieces thereof." Know-how is conceived
of as being capable of having autonomous existence, and not
necessarily as merely an accessory to patented inventions.
H. Use of the term know-how in technology transfer agreements
The preceding definition, whatever its merits may be, enlarges
the long list of formulations already proposed on the matter. In
the absence of legislative definitions, none of these ad hoc form-
ulations are likely to be helpful in clarifying contractual relations.
The ambiguity of the term "know-how" in commercial practice is
53 J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23 at 147.
" See Part VII § A infra.
65 F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 114.
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as great as it is in academic and legislative fields. Only by rare
chance will parties negotiating a transfer of technology agreement
spontaneously agree on the meaning attributed to the term.
Hence, it is strongly suggested that in drafting such agree-
ments the use of the term "know-how" be avoided, replacing it
with clear descriptions of: 1) the type of information to be
transferred according to its content and function (process instruc-
tions; formulae, designs, etc.); and 2) the vehicle to be used for its
communications (written documents, personnel assistance, etc.).
V. LEGAL NATURE OF KNOW-HOW
A. Know-how as property
Clauses indicating that the technology to be disclosed "is and
shall continue to be the property of the supplying party" are fre-
quently found in technology transfer agreements. A proposal to
this effect was presented by developed countries (Group B) in the
negotiation of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology.56 A corollary of this thesis is the treatment of con-
tracts as mere "leasing" agreements whereby the supplying party
authorizes the use of but retains the rights in the technology.
After the period specified in the agreement, the leasee may no
longer exercise any rights over the "leased" technology. 7
A majority of American commentators adopts the theory of the
existence of property rights in know-how, although a minority re-
jects such an opinion.' This position must be analyzed in light of
United States law. As stated by Dessemontet:
"Property" in Anglo-American law is to be clearly distinguished
from property in civil law. On the one hand, common law judges
are free to recognize new types of property-in equity, no
numerus clausus limits their discretion, either as to the subject
of the right or as to its contents, that is to say, the powers and
privileges that are bestowed upon the owner. On the other hand,
the term "property" appears much more imprecise than in con-
tinental law. Broadly speaking, it can designate any asset of
some value, that is to say, a right in rem as well as any legally
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, art. 5.4(ii),
U.N.Doc. TD/CODE TOT/24 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 773, 787 (1980).
Socialist countries also supported this view. The Draft proclaims "respect for the confiden-
tiality and proprietary nature of ... any trade secret, secret know-how, and all other con-
fidential information .... " Id. art. 5.4().
5 Wise & Seyler, Secrets and Know-how Under Siege, LES NOVRELLES 1 (Mar. 1978).
F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 323-24.
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enforceable claim and interest. Thus, on occasions, the expres-
sion "property" may extend to rights in personam. The nar-
rower use of the word remains, however, limited to rights en-
forceable against an indefinite number of third parties, such as
the rights and interests a man has in land and chattels to the ex-
clusion of others. Nevertheless, since the rights of the owner in
relation to third parties are at the core of the controversies
which surround the protection of know-how, the existence both
of a broad and narrow meaning of the word 'property' clearly
leads to a certain amount of confusion, evident in comparative
studies. 9
The preceding quotation illustrates the limited applicability of
the conception under examination. Furthermore, there are no
definite decisions stating that trade secrets (know-how) are prop-
erty. Du Pont Powder Company v. Masland,l a landmark decision
of the United States Supreme Court, caused considerable uncer-
tainty." The Court stated:
The word property as applied to trademarks and trade secrets
is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences
of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary re-
quirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any
valuable secret or not, the defendant knows the facts, whatever
they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The
property may be denied but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore, the starting point for the present matter is not the
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them."
Such a notion is grounded on principles that are incompatible with
the definite classification of property rights found in civil law
countries. For instance, in France, the legislation has evolved
toward the supression of any idea of property over an invention. 3
According to Roubier, only a few authors have attempted to treat
trade secrets as property. Offenses concerning the violation of
trade secrets have rarely been alluded to as a true theft." In sum,
it is possible to conclude that whatever the merit of this theory
", Id. at 327-28 (citations deleted).
244 U.S. 100 (1917).
61 F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 325.
62 244 U.S. at 102 (1917).
F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 243.
P. ROUBIER, LE DROIT DE LA PROPRI.T9 INDUSTRIELLE 371 (1954).
0
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within the United States,65 it should not be extended to different
systems of law or to proposed international regulations.
B. Know-how and intangibles (immaterial giiterrecht)
Based on Kholer's theory of intangibles, certain authors"6 have
held that know-how is a legally protected entity. Along the same
lines, GOmez Segade states that the lack of an exclusive right does
not prevent the classification of know-how as an intangible. 7
However, many advocates of the intangibles doctrine reject its
application to unpatented technologies and inventions. Ascarelli,
in particular, indicates that
in the case of inventions, the process of creating an intangible
good is brought to a close only by patenting. . . . Those
... who also want to find an object of absolute right in the inven-
tion, in fact confuse two distinguishable problems: the subjec-
tive right of the inventor to obtain a patent (that naturally is
always the case) and the existence of an intangible good, apart
from a patent. The latter must indeed be denied. Therefore, the
inventor who decides in advance to keep secret his own inven-
tion cannot acquire an absolute right to an intangible good
which does not yet exist and thus he cannot invoke this positive
protection of the law since he is not subject to its controlling
limits (ie., limits of taxation, duration, and implementation).
Rather he places trust in the possibility of protecting the secret
and in the recovery of the damage incurred against those who
might violate it. This in fact happens for the great majority of
such devices, although technical, as they cannot be the object of
the patent (ie., an absolute right of patent cannot be conferred
in any event) since they lack the necessary legal prerequisites. 8
A similar opinion has been expressed by Voltaggio Lucchessi, for
whom the definition of an intangible is conditioned upon the syn-
thesis of a determined factual situation (fattispecie) and the formal
element established by positive law."
Antitrust specialists seem to be particularly reluctant to accept the notion that know-
how constitutes property. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service does not recognize know-how
as property for certain tax purposes. Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
See, e.g., G. Sena, I DIRITTI SULLE INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALLI (1976); J.
GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23.
17 J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23, at 83.
T. ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BENI IMMATERIAL 448-50 (1957).
F. VOLTAGGIO LUCCHESSI, I BENI IMMATERIALI 5 (1962); See also Laquis, Revision del
Convenio de Paris en el Marco latinoamericano, La Propriedad Industrial y el Abuso del
Derecho: Problemas de la Transferencia de Technologia (Know-how) a los Paises/en Desar-
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C. Know-how as a monopoly of fact
Certain obstacles encountered by the theory of the proprietary
nature of know-how under a civil law system are illustrated by the
following authors. Magnin concludes that it is impossible to state
with certainty that one can have property rights in an invention,
and consequently, in the inventive idea made concrete through
the application of know-how.70 Furthermore, in conjunction with
Page, Magnin adds that the appropriations which appear gradual-
ly as the technical creation proceeds toward the stage of in-
dustrial use are but appropriations of fact.7'
The treatment of know-how as a mere monopoly of fact, deprived
of specific legal protection, characterizes the position of a majority
of Latin American authors who have analysed the matter.7 A
basic starting point for this concept is that positive law has not in-
stituted a subjective right over know-how. In the absence of such
legal recognition, know-how is a mere factual situation eventually
subject to the contractual conditions laid down by the parties (in
order to preserve its secret character or to implement its
transfer), and, under certain circumstances, to the indirect protec-
tion conferred by unfair competition law. As stated by Laquis,
"unpatented technical knowledge constitutes an objective fact,
however devoid of legal status as long as it is not recognized by
the law, and it is hence unopposible to third parties. 73
It is interesting to note that most of the International Associa-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI) national
groups have agreed that know-how cannot be considered an ex-
clusive right. Math6ly states "in fact, know-how, by its very
nature, cannot be treated as an exclusive property." Math6ly
supports his conclusion with the following:
It has been pointed out that know-how is made up of
robo, La Declaracion de Mfico, 9 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES
488 (1976).
7 F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 246.
7 1&
"' See P. DI GUGLIELMO, LA INVENCION PATENTABLE (1968); see also R. ETCHEVERRY,
MANUAL DE DERECHO COMERCIAL MODERNO 433 (1977); S. LA PERA, supra note 48; F.
MORENO, CARTILLA SOBRE AIQUISICION DE TECHNOLOGfA (1977); Correa, La Legislacion
Argentina Sobre Transferencia de Tecnologia desde el Exterior, 7 JURIDICA 331 (1975); La-
quis, supra note 69. But see Aracama Zorraquin, supra note 47; and Plate & Boglino, supra
note 47.
78 Laquis, supra note 69, at 491.
"' Mathbly, Summary Report (AIPPI) (1972).
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heterogeneous elements: it can include innovations, but it can
also include known elements, which have simply been assembl-
ed, selected and implemented. For these known elements, an ex-
clusive right cannot be justified.
Furthermore, one can also enter into possession of know-how of
a third party without thereby misappropriating it, by putting it
together legitimately by personal efforts, similar to those made
by the first proprietor.
Besides, and as the New Zealand's report remarks so accurately,
the extension of the exclusive right to know-how would risk be-
ing detrimental to the patent system. This would constitute a
possible danger which it would be as well to avoid."5
These arguments certainly complement those expressed by the
Latin American authors referred to above. They indicate that
even in situations where existing law may allow the structuring of
a property right over know-how, such recognition would be incom-
patible with the nature of know-how. From the view of developing
countries, the acceptance of the proprietary thesis would con-
situte a grave mistake, which could only operate to reinforce the
monopolistic control over technologies transferred from foreign
sources.
In sum, because the present situation in civil law countries
(mainly France, Italy, and nations in Latin America) seems to be
represented adequately by the theory of know-how as a monopoly
of fact, it would not be advisable to alter the situation through
legislation. Obviously, this does not exclude the indirect protec-
tion of secret know-how afforded by contractual obligations or un-
fair competition rules. It is precisely in the determination of the
premises and conditions for such enforcement where there still exists
a vast field for positive legislative action.
D. Other conceptions of the legal nature of know-how
It is outside the scope of this study to give a full description and
analysis of all the various legal definitions of know-how. It is worth-
while to note, however, the existence of a trend toward recogniz-
ing a personal right in know-how, which might be justified by a
sort of "private life" of the enterprise. For some authors, the in-
stitution of such rights should be accompanied by the creation of a
system of voluntary registration of know-how in order to facilitate
"' Id. (emphasis added).
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the proof of the content and date of possession of know-how in
cases of misappropriation."6
E. Implications for technology transfer agreements
The resolution of the legal character of know-how has mean-
ingful implications. The notion of the existence of property rights
implies that the recipient may be subject to a number of restric-
tions, such as the prohibition against the continuing use of know-
how after the expiration of the agreement, and the obligation of
returning to the supplier all technical documentation furnished
during the agreement.
Some commentators in developing countries have tried to
counteract these results by arguing that technology transfer
agreements are in fact "sales" of technology whereby the reci-
pient "acquires" it." This approach, however, by questioning the
effects, fails to reach the real issue: the existence of rights in
know-how. In this sense, Magnin criticizes the use of the terms
"sale" or "lease": "The owner of know-how is vested with not a
single right in the intangible elements of know-how, which for this
reason cannot be the subject of a sales contract or lease." 8 It is
evident that as far as know-how is not categorized by law, conse-
quences such as those described above cannot be deemed to be a
natural effect of technology transfer contracts. In this context,
restrictions on the use-of know-how after the expiration of the
agreement lack any legal support.
These contrasting solutions point out the crucial importance
that the determination of the law applicable to the agreement will
have on any decision about the validity of conditions concerning
the transfer and subsequent use of know-how. To the extent that
a contract is subject, for instance, to United States law (and even-
tually to the jurisdiction of its courts), the recipient party in a civil
law country may be faced with legal solutions that are contrary to
the basic principles of its own national law, and detrimental to an
otherwise legitimate use of the transferred know-how. It is
,' F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 247.
7' See J. ALVAREZ SOBERANIS, LA REGULACION DE LAS INVENCIONES Y LAS MARCAS Y DE LA
TRANSFERENCIA TECHNOLOGICA 316 (1979); Salazar L6pez, Criterios del Comitd de Regalias
de Colombia Sobre Transferencia de Technologfa, 4 REVISTA DEL DERECHO INDUSTRIAL
(1980). Similarly, in the negotiation of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology, the "Group of 77" has marked its preference for the terminology "acquisition"
of technology and "acquiring" party.
To F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 290.
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necessary to stress the need for know-how recipients to undertake
a careful analysis of the implications that a choice of law may have
on the conditions concerning the contractual communication of
know-how.
VI. AGREEMENTS FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF KNOW-HOW
A. Legal nature
It is a common practice to define agreements for the transfer of
know-how as "license" agreements. This practice is incorrect
regarding the character of such contracts because the possessor of
know-how has no monopoly of right or exclusivity in its use, and
therefore, unlike patented technology, he is unable to prevent its
utilization by third parties. The grant of a license is premised on
the existence of a jus prohibendi that does not exist here.79 On the
other hand, the notion of "assignment" or "sale" of know-how
presupposes the possibility of transferring rights in know-how,
which are not recognized by law.
In substance, know-how transfer agreements regulate the com-
munication of know-how from the supplier to the recipient. When
the know-how consists of secret knowledge and experience, the
purpose of the agreement for which the recipient has paid con-
sideration is the disclosure of such information. When the agree-
ment refers to the transfer of non-secret know-how, s° it provides
the recipient access, in a systematic manner, to knowledge and ex-
perience, which is otherwise dispersed. The foundation for the
contract is the obligation of the supplier to harmonize and assem-
ble the information for transmission to the recipient."s Different
opinions exist as to whether this obligation of communication is to
be defined as an "obligation of doing" (obligation de faire) or as an
"obligation of giving" (obligation de donner) a determined thing.
These differences are intimately linked with the underlying no-
tion of the legal nature of know-how. If the contract of know-how
constitutes "la concession d un bien mobilier," the sale of a per-
sonal good, it would, as suggested by Demin, 2 necessarily involve
obligations concerning the "delivery" of such good. However,
7' See Correa, supra note 72, at 333.
'o See text accompanying footnote 93 infra.
Mousseron has compared the contracts of know-how to "educational contracts"
wherein the teacher communicates knowledge which he does not own. J. MOUSSERON,
ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU KNOW-HOW 14 (n.d.), cited in F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 290.
82 p. DEMIN, LE CONTRAT DE KNOW-HOW 20 (1968).
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under the concept of know-how as a monopoly of fact, the execu-
tion of the agreement implies obligations on the supplier to
transfer effectively the knowledge and experience agreed upon,
by employing all appropriate means at his disposal (written
materials, personal assistance, etc.)
B. Classification of Know-how Agreements
Once it is established that agreements for the transfer of know-
how consist primarily of an obligation de faire on the part of the
supplier, it is necessary to elucidate whether such obligation can
be characterized as an obligation of means only or as an obligation
that involves the fulfillment of certain results.
As this stage, it is necessary to recall that agreements for the
transfer of know-how have not been regulated comprehensively.
In some countries (e.g., Brazil), existing laws and regulations
provide for certain "guarantees" that technology transfer
agreements should contain. In other legislation, there are also
isolated provisions regarding certain aspects of contracts involv-
ing know-how, mainly the question of its use after the expiration
of the agreement. The most comprehensive approach for
establishing a framework applicable to know-how agreements (as
well as to other types of technology transfer transactions) is likely
to be Chapter V (Obligations, Responsibilities, and Guarantees) of
the proposed Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, which is
still under negotiation at the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development.
As a result of the lack of regulation on these matters, the ques-
tion posed above cannot be resolved adequately under current
law. If general practice is to be taken into account, agreements for
the transfer of know-how might be considered as implying obliga-
tions involving the results expected from the application of know-
how. Magnin states that "ignoring those rare know-how agree-
ments in which the supplier agrees only to transmit various docu-
ments to the other party, with no further obligations as to their
application, know-how agreements represent a form also of ser-
vice contract or joint venture."" The duty of the supplier not only
to provide the necessary information and data, but also to ensure
its proper application, is a desirable feature of such contracts.
U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/24 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 773 (1980).
F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 294.
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However, many authors have maintained that the duty of the
supplier should be deemed to be fulfilled entirely upon providing
the information, and that this feature usually distinguishes know-
how agreements from other agreements, particularly "technical
assistance" agreements.85 Indeed, the distinction between con-
tracts on know-how and on technical assistance is not easily made.
As previously noted, in certain Latin American countries the ex-
pression "technical assistance" is broader, including different
forms of transfer of know-how. For some authors, a main criterion
of distinction is that in the former, technology is of a secret
character, while non-secret in the latter.86
It is evident that the resolution of this question also depends
upon the underlying notion of know-how, its legal nature, and the
type of agreement used in its transfer. In conjunction with the
concept that is presented here, the provision of technical
assistance may be a possible means for transferring know-how
through the personal assistance of the supplier's technicians.
It is possible to define a "technical assistance agreement" as an
autonomous means of technology transfer that is characterized by
1) a transfer occurring through the collaboration of supplier's per-
sonnel (including services, advice, training, etc.); 2) the transfer of
non-secret technology; and 3) remuneration charged in accordance
with the duration of the agreement and other relevant services
performed.
C. Validity of agreements on know-how
1. Patentable inventions
The possibility of conferring the use, as secret know-how, of
patentable inventions that have not been patented has given rise
to controversy. In Lear v. Adkins,7 a United States Supreme
Court decision, the dissent attacked the legality of an agreement
for the communication of patentable inventions kept secret by
their possessor. An Italian author has opined similarly, that
whereas the object of a know-how contract is not the transfer of
the expectation of a right to patent but rather the ability secret-
ly to exploit the invention, with the concomitant obligation for
See P. DEMIN, supra note 82; Alvarez Soberanis, Actos Juridicos de Inscripci6n
Obligatoria en el Registro Nacional de Transferencia de Tecnologia, JURIDICA 44 (1974);
Farina, Contratos de Transferencia de Tecnologfa, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 4 (1972).
J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23, at 154.
395 U.S. 653 (1968).
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the grantee not to reveal the invention and consequently, by im-
plication, not to seek a patent, we are therefore out of the realm
of a contractual freedom that could legitimate and justify such a
claim.88
However, the invalidation of such agreements is likely to
facilitate further monopolization of technology. 9 Know-how
agreements do not infringe upon the patent system, and, even
though in a restricted manner, they ensure the disclosure of in-
ventions to third parties through legal channels.
2. Unpatentable inventions
Some authorities have questioned the validity of agreements for
the transfer of legally unpatentable inventions (e.g., phar-
maceuticals and food).9 The contrary view favors the legality of
such agreements because they grant protection to unpatentable
know-how (and to the agreements for its transfer), which en-
courages inventions.9
The validity of agreements for the use of pharmaceutical form-
ulae, which are not patentable in Argentina, was recognized by an
Argentine court of appeal on the ground that the contract had
been freely agreed upon by the parties.92 Without prejudice to the
application, where appropriate, of specific legislation (mainly the
law on transfer of foreign technology) this solution seems to be
compatible with the interest of national industry in incorporating
technologies for the local manufacture of drugs.
3. Non-secret know-how
As a rule, when technologies are transferred to developing
countries they have already been used in developed markets. In
most cases, they are likely to have lost their secret character, in
the originating and in other industrialized countries. In some
cases, technologies transferred have already become known in the
country to which they are exported. In other cases, however,
" Capizzano, Contrato di Know-how e Invenzione non Brevettata, 1 REVISTA DE DIRITTO
INDUSTRIALE 343 (1974), cited in Bianchi, Reflexiones Preliminares Sobre los Contratos de
Know-how, 1 REVISTA DEL DERECHO INDUSTRIALE 511 (1979).
" Id. at 517.
See GRECO & VERCELLONE, LE INVENZIONI E ISUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 318 (1968); Capiz-
zano, supra note 88.
9 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1973); Bianchi, supra note 88.
" Gallino v. Lab. Otto S.A. (1976), cited in 10 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL Y DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES 861 (1978).
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given the relatively low technological capacity existing in develop-
ing countries, it is likely that technologies that have been partially
or totally diffused in developed countries continue to be publicly
unknown in the country of importation. Secrecy is, of course, a
very relative concept both with regard to the number of persons
who may actually know of it or have access to it, as well as with
respect to its territorial scope. 3 The complexity of issues involved
in these two different situations requires deeper consideration.
a) Know-how that is known/available in the receiving country
Certain Latin American statutes include provisions that pro-
hibit the importation of technology available in the country.
Argentine law 21617 provided that the competent body could
refuse to authorize agreements:
a) when the technology upon transfer were provedly obsolete;
b) when there will be in the public domain and freely accessible
in the country technology of the same specifications, nature, and
quality as that which is the object of the transfer. It is
understood that there will exist in the public domain that which
is not protected by secret means or by private privileges of in-
dustrial property. It is also understood that there will be freely
accessible throughout the country that technology so that
anyone may obtain access to it upon reasonable conditions. 4
A similar policy seems to be applied in Mexico and Colombia.
Mexican law on transfer of technology stipulates the rejection of
agreements involving "technology freely available in the
country, 95 while Colombian Decree 1234 (1972) indicates the need
to evaluate "the possibility of elaborating on the product within
similar conditions, yet without burdening the product with
royalties, through the use of ordinary processes susceptible of ap-
plying themselves toward that end, and confroming to the ad-
vances of modern technology and to the national industrial
development.""
'3 See F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 107-91; J. GOMEZ SEGADE, supra note 23. Discus-
sion of this issue is outside the scope of this study. For the purposes of this study, the
"secret" character of know-how is to be judged according to its availability within a deter-
mined branch of industry.
" Argentine Law No. 21617, art. 10(a)(b) (1977).
" Mexican law on the transfer of technology, art. 7(i).
" Colombian Decree No. 1234 of July 18, 1972, reprinted in INSTITUTO PARA LA INTEGRA-
CION DE AMERICA LATINA, REGIMEN DE LA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA EN LAS PAISES DE
AMERICA LATINA (1977).
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The application of these provisions has encountered obstacles,
primarily the lack of adequate sources of technological informa-
tion to undertake the appraisal of transferred technologies, and
the general shortage of personnel and financial resources of
government bodies. In addition, the notions of technologies
"available" or "obtainable" involve complicated conceptual
aspects, and have implications for other areas of public policy.'
United States law provides stricter and clearer treatment of
agreements on non-secret know-how. Under United States law,
the secret character of know-how is an essential condition of the
transfer agreement's legality. The Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins," declared that contracts covering know-how that has
become publicly available are not legally enforceable. In other
words,
United States courts will enforce know-how license agreements
against the licensee only so long as a portion of the know-how
transferred to the licensee retains its status as secret and
valuable information, that is, the know-how license is not enforc-
ed if the knowledge forming the licensee's consideration
becomes part of the public domain."
A possible exception to this principle might be agreements which
provide for the transfer of know-how through supplier's tech-
nicians.'"
In United States and Latin American law, it is irrelevant
whether the recipient of non-secret know-how is unable to acquire
it without considerable effort and time, or whether he has obtained
an advantage by virtue of the contract. French courts have,
however, arrived at a different solution by recognizing the validity
of such agreements. La Cour de Cassation has decided
that in revealing to an industrial establishment process or
techniques not known to that party, and which that party would
not have been able to discover by himself without long research
and costly attempts, the supplier has furnished to that party an
appreciable advantage for which he is therefore authorized to
receive payments.'0 '
" Correa, supra note 21, at 151.
" 395 U.S. 653 (1968).
M. Finnegan, The Effect of United States and EEC Antitrust Law on International
Licensing and Licensing into Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ID/NG/4 (1972).
10 See F. DESSEMONTET, aupra note 24, at 158.
oo: F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 325.
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The multiple implications of the issue under consideration
render it difficult to propose solutions adapted to the particular
circumstances and needs of developing countries. One basic princi-
ple is that anyone has the right to use knowledge which is not
under a monopoly of right (which only can be conferred by the in-
dustrial property system), provided that it is not illegally obtained
(under unfair competition law or otherwise). Publicly available
knowledge may be freely utilized without limitation.
At a practical and a policy level, questions may arise as to
whether the enforcement of agreements of non-secret know-how,
whereby the recipient obtains an advantage (e.g., money or time
savings), is likely to facilitate or hinder the rapid diffusion of
technology needed in developing countries. Furthermore, it is
uncertain whether, given existing technical capacities, such en-
forcement will promote or restrict competition and development,
and whether the overall benefits of such a policy justify its costs.
The response to these questions may depend upon the interna-
tional or domestic character of the transaction. In the former case,
the prohibition of agreements of previously known technologies
may foster the use of local sources of technology, and improve the
balance of payments by avoiding unnecessary remittances abroad.
The "technical assistance agreements" may furnish an acceptable
framework under which the remuneration for technology is linked
to the performance of services by the supplier. Under these agree-
ments, conditions restricting the use of technology or imposing
payments related to production or sales would be unacceptable.
b) Know-how that has lost its secret character in the country of
the supplier but which is not publicly available in the re-
ceiving country
As mentioned above, given the time lag existing between the in-
troduction of innovations in developed countries and their
transfer to developing countries, it is likely that a great part of
transferred know-how has lost its secret character in developed
countries at the time of transfer. Some authorities and case law in
developed countries have examined this issue. 10 2 It is believed that
"[tihe status of know-how as a trade secret should not suffer even
if it is commonly known in some parts of the world as long as the
'" See B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 143; F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 157, 192-210;
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND ANTI-TRUST LAWS 192 (1958); J. GOMEZ SEGADE, Supra
note 23, at 200.
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grant of the know-how is made in a foreign country when such
knowledge is available."'13 It is unnecessary to emphasize the im-
plications of this position for developing countries.
It is interesting to note that this position has been indirectly in-
corporated into the Group B Draft on an International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology. In the text addressing export
restrictions, the draft proposes restrictions on technology exports
to countries "where relevant know-how has retained its confiden-
tial character."'10 This proposal should not be approved, par-
ticularly in light of the legal and economic situations of developing
countries. Unlike the principle established by most of the world's
patent laws with regard to the universal effects of the publication
of an invention in any country, this doctrine strictly limits the ef-
fects of know-how disclosure to the country in which it takes
place. As a result, know-how would enjoy a larger and longer pro-
tection than that generally permitted by patentable inventions.
Furthermore, because know-how is not registered, as patents are,
and because there is no definite time limit for its protection (as far
as it is secret), know-how would be protected in a country for an
indefinite period, even if it has become publicly known elswhere.
Extracontractual protection of know-how is to be determined by
the applicable national law. It cannot be derived from or based
upon any universal principle. Thus, the determination of viola-
tions under unfair competition law depends upon the concept of
secrecy, disclosure, misappropriation, and related notions defined
by national laws. Moreover, such violations could only be sanctioned
if the unlawful conduct takes place or produces effects in a country
where the know-how is still secret. The mere introduction of a
product manufactured by application of the know-how does not
constitute unlawful conduct, as contended by Group B.
Apart from the question of extracontractual protection of know-
how, it is necessary to determine the legality of agreements for
the transfer of know-how into countries where it is not available.
It is also necessary to admit the legality of such agreements in
principle. This conclusion stems from the requirement that
developing countries receive only those technologies that are not
"available" or "obtainable" in the recipient country, as provided
for by Latin American legislation cited previously.'015 Additional
103 B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 143.
'" Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, art. 4(B)(10),
U.N.Doc. TD/CODE TOT/24 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 773, 783 (1980).
"I See notes 94, 95, & 96 supra.
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limitations may be appropriate as dictated by the individual cir-
cumstances surrounding each know-how agreement.
VII. TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE COMMUNICATION OF
SECRET KNOW-HOW
This section discusses some aspects of contractual relations for
the transfer of secret know-how and the issues involved when
such know-how becomes known during the term specified for the
agreement. This discussion is included in order to suggest possi-
ble de lege ferenda solutions to the issues involved therein, and to
furnish guidelines for the negotiation and drafting of an ap-
propriate agreement. Before entering into the analysis of specific
terms and conditions, however, it is necessary to make a brief
comment on the position of potential recipients in developing
countries, and on possible ways to increase their bargaining
capacity. The legal treatment and contractual obligations ap-
plicable to the transfer of know-how differ radically, depending
upon the secret character or lack thereof of the transferred know-
how. It is crucial for the recipient to discriminate between infor-
mation which is actually confidential and that which is not.
Secrecy is a relative concept, the definition of which involves
major difficulties. Also, the potential recipient generally lacks ap-
propriate information about available technologies. He is not in a
position to elucidate which parts of the offered technology are
publicly know. As mentioned above, such determination should be
an ingredient of the unpackaging process. Finally, the potential
supplier will usually present its technology as unique and con-
fidential and will certainly not favor any inquiry by the recipient
which questions the actual status of the technology.
In spite of these difficulities, the potential recipient should
clarify, from the very beginning, the nature of the technology to be
obtained and segregate the pieces of information that are confiden-
tial. In particular, he should investigate the extent of the informa-
tion's secret character and the classification which the supplier has
given to information.
A. Disclosure as consideration ("causa") of the agreement
As previously noted, the disclosure of secret knowledge is the
basic consideration of a transfer agreement on confidential know-
how. 106 In comparing know-how and patent licenses, Milgrim states
1" See Part VI § A supra.
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that "the license reward for a trade secret tends to be a function
of consideration for disclosure; for patent, consideration for
use.
, , 107
The existence of secrecy should be considered as an essential
condition for the conclusion of a valid agreement, as well as for
the maintenance of the validity during the specified term of dura-
tion. Therefore, the agreement is void if it was concluded under
the assumption of the existence of secret know-how, which is
thereafter proved to be known; or an agreement valid at its origin
may become invalid if know-how loses its secret character before
the time stipulated for its termination. Payments made thereafter
should be compensated.
United States law, particularly since Lear v. Adkins,"° has en-
forced these principles. Regarding the principal obligation of the
recipient, that is, to make payments agreed upon, Dessemontet
observes that:
[T]he question was not clearly resolved before 1969. The majori-
ty of authors considered that the agreement by which a person
undertakes to pay a royalty or a lump sum for the communica-
tion of non-confidential information is null and void, in the
absence of some consideration promised by the licensor. Cases
usually support this conclusion. Since Lear v. Adkins, however,
there is no longer any room for doubt, since the majority of the
Supreme Court justices prohibited any agreement involving the
communication of non-secret information, and allowed the
reclaiming of unwarranted royalties.'"
Magnin also concedes that, under French law,
the disappearance of the know-how's secret character and its in-
tegration into the state of technology at no fault of the recipient
may lead him to view the transfer agreement as suddenly lack-
ing consideration and through application of article 1131 of the
French Civil Code the duty to pay royalties will be discharged.
The know-how contract becomes invalid due to the disap-
pearance of one of the essential conditions of the validity of
agreements as enumerated in article 1108 of the French Civil
Code."0
However, this author mentions the possibility of including clauses
" Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton. of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30
(1971).
'" 385 U.S. 653 (1968).
'" F. DESSEMONTET, supra note 24, at 187-88 (citations omitted).
"' F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 322.
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obliging the recipient to make payments even after the know-how
has lost its secret character as an application of the general principle
that "the terms of valid agreements control the rights of the
parties."'1
Observance of the agreement's terms, notwithstanding the
subsequent general availability of know-how, is also endorsed by
Milgrim and other authorities, citing a leading United States case,
Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. v. John J. Reynolds Co.
Inc., in which the district court held that although the licensee did
bargain originally for a secret formula (which it received), it does
not follow that it bargained for continued secrecy. There was no
failure of consideration, for the licensor made no implied represen-
tation that the secret would remain so, and the licensee took it
subject to the risk that it may fall into the public domain.
Positive regulation of this matter is needed to ensure that
whenever secrecy constitutes the consideration of the agreement,
continued secrecy is a condition for the continued validity of the
agreement. It is not fair, particularly in the case of developing
countries, to consider the lack or subsequent loss of secrecy as a
"risk" that the recipient should assume. The recipient will not be
in a position to evaluate such risk and will rely on representations
made by the supplier. This solution is in accord with specific re-
quirements of antitrust legislation and with general principles of
law. An important precedent regarding know-how ancillary to
licensed patents has been established by the EEC Commission in
its 1979 draft proposal for a block exemption regulation for patent
license and ancillary know-how agreements."' Article 3.4 (d) of the
proposal declares that a violation of article 85 (1) of the Treaty of
Rome occurs if
the obligation on the part of the licensee to pay royalties ...
after manufacturing processes or other know-how communicated
under the license have entered into the public domain, unless en-
try into the public domain is attributable to some default on the
part of the licensee, or of an undertaking that has economic con-
nections with him, without prejudice to any right of the licensor
to receive appropriately reduced royalties where the licensing
agreement continues in respect of patents or parts of patents
that remain in force or of manufacturing processes or other
,know-how that have not entered into the public domain. 113
111 IdL
11 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 (1979).
"' Id. at 16.
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When drafting an agreement on secret know-how, issues
discussed previously should be taken into account. The agreement
should contain: 1) a clear statement reflecting that the disclosure
of secret knowledge is the consideration sought by the recipient
(this can be included in a "preamble" to the contract. For instance,
"in consideration for the disclosure of secret know-how by the sup-
plier, the recipient will .... "); 2) a representation by the supplier
regarding the character he attributes to the know-how to be
transferred 1 4 (for example, the supplier represents that on the
date of signing the agreement, to the best of his knowledge, secret
technical information to be disclosed under the agreement is not
publicly known or available to third parties in the industrial-
sector concerned); and 3) specific clauses contemplating the even-
tual termination of the contract and other effects following the in-
tegration of the know-how into public knowledge. A possible
stipulation could read as follows:
In case the technical information transferred under this agree-
ment loses its secret character, independently of the recipient,
this agreement will be terminated and the recipient will have
the right to continue in the use of transferred technical infor-
mation without any further payments or other obligations
regarding such use.
The further use of patents/trademarks licensed herein will be
the object of a new revised agreement to be agreed upon be-
tween the parties."5
Finally, it is necessary to regulate the effects, and particularly
the total or partial restitution of payments made, in case the
know-how transferred is not secret at the time the agreement is
concluded. In this situation, factors such as the good or bad faith
of the supplier and costs incurred by him by viture of the transfer
should be taken into account.
B. Confidentiality obligations
1. Legal character
In principle, the recipient's duty not to disclose the secret
know-how to third parties must be expressly provided for in the
... The existence of a "guarantee" for this purpose is suggested in F. MAGNIN, supra note
34, at 326. However, he recommends potential suppliers, in order to avoid eventual claims
by the recipient, "ne jamais presenter le know-how comme inconnu de la concurrence, quel
que puisse etre le degr6 presum6 de son secret." Id.
"' A similar proposal is made by F. MAGNIN, supra note 34, at 406.
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contract. There is no reason to presume, in the absence of an ex-
plicit stipulation or legal provision, that an obligation of confiden-
tiality exists.
However, the existence of implied obligations of secrecy is
found in Anglo-American law and other authorities. '16 The most
recent Argentine law on transfer of technology followed this ap-
proach by establishing that "the recipient shall keep technical
secrets specified as such in the agreement" as an "implied clause"
to be observed by the recipient regardless of whether it is ex-
pressed in the contract.1 ' There is no sound support for this
reasoning. Especially when developing countries are involved, the
recipient should not be bound implicitly to refrain from revealing
the secret know-how if it has become publicly known. This is so
because the developing country is not in a position to appraise
itself of circumstances not disclosed by the supplier.
2. Scope
Confidentiality obligations should attach only to such items of
knowledge that the supplier has specified as "secret." General
clauses stating that all information to be transferred is subject to
such an obligation must be avoided. Such provisions should not be
a means for the supplier to exercise undue influence and control
over the recipient's production and purchasing operations. As
commented by Singh and Finnegan,
[a] confidentiality provision restricting disclosure of information
to third parties without the licensor's permission can, if strictly
interpreted, considerably circumscribe and confine the licensee's
choice in the procurement of intermediate products, parts and
components. Such a provision can and has been used to channel
the licensee's purchasing operations in certain directions, often
back to the licensor which is not necessarily in the interest of
the licensee or the recipient country, because of the implications
of transfer pricing, foreign exchange costs, and the like. '18
Consequently, when drafting an agreement for the communica-
tion of know-how, it is advisable to insert a clause limiting the ex-
tent of the obligation of confidentiality by stating:
See G. CABANELLAS, CONTRATOS DE LICENCIA Y DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TECHNOLOGIA EN
EL DERECHO PRIVADO 341 (1980); A. TURNER, supra note 28, at 237, 273; G. SENA, I DIRITTI
SULLE INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALI (1976), cited in Bianchi, supra note 88, at 524.
I,, Argentine law on transfer of technology, No. 21617, art. 8(d) (1977).
R. Singh & M. Finnegan, Confidentiality Issues in Technology Transfer Agreements
with Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. RTN/9, 9 (1978).
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Without prejudice to the obligation of confidentiality stipulated
in Paragraph -, the recipient will have the right to disclose to
third parties the secret technical information received under
this agreement, to the extent that such disclosure is necessary
for the purposes of subcontracting, procurement of materials,
parts and components or any purpose related to the manufac-
ture and sale of products covered by the agreement.
A more delicate and difficult problem concerns the possibility
for the recipient to transfer the know-how to third parties, acting
as a "subtransferor." The key issue in this regard is whether the
obligation not to disclose refers only to conduct that may result in
the general diffusion of the technology or whether it also refers to
limited disclosure of secret know-how to a third party, even under
appropriate safeguards of confidentiality. Confidentiality obliga-
tions seem to have been interpreted generally in the latter more
restricted sense. This has been the interpretation of the EEC
Commission in Burroughs Corp. v. Delplanque"19 and Burroughs
Corp. v. Geha Werke. 20 The Commission indicated that
the prohibition imposed on Delplanque, concerning the giving of
sublicenses except to its wholly-controlled subsidiaries, given
that the holder of a patent is the only one able to permit the
utilization of his right in the invention and that the secrecy of
know-how can only be guaranteed if the owner of the know-how
may determine to whom the secret shall be communicated, does
not constitute a restriction on competition.' 2'
Accordingly, article 2(3) of the Commission's draft proposal on a
block exemption regulation for patent licenses recognizes the
lawfulness of "the obligation to refrain from granting sublicenses
or assigning the license to a third party."'"
Although the above interpretation finds justification in the sup-
plier's interest in retaining the secrecy of know-how, there are
situations where the recognition of an exception to the confiden-
tiality clause may be important. The recipient's transfer of the
know-how to other enterprises within the receiving country may
be desirable in developing countries that wish to enhance the
... Burroughs AG v. Delplanque, Decision of the Commission, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
13) 50 (1972), reprinted in 11 COMM. MKT. L. R. (R.P. Supp.) D67 (1972).
12 Burroughs AG v. Geha-Werke, Decision of the Commission, 15 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L
13) 53 (1972), reprinted in 11 COMM. MKT. L.R. (R.P. Supp.) D72 (1972).
"' Burroughs AG v. Delplanque, Decision of the Commission, 15 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L
13) 52 (1972), reprinted in 11 COMM. MKT L. R. (R.P. Supp.) D71 (1972).
12 22 O.J. EUR. COMM (No. C 58) 15 (1979).
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horizontal transfer of technology in order to reduce payments in
foreign currencies, to promote the transfer of already adopted or
"nationalized" technologies, and to foster the establishment of
technological capabilities in the country concerned. Such a
transfer is likely to be particularly relevant in cases where the
recipient is a public enterprise ultimately interested in sharing
the received know-how with other enterprises of the same nature.
Nonetheless, it is not advisable to require that all contracts con-
tain a clause allowing the recipient to re-transfer the know-how to
other enterprises. Requests for the re-transfer of know-how prob-
ably will be infrequent. Furthermore, a request for an exception
of this nature is likely to result in a price increase or other un-
favorable contract conditions.
Wherever the negotiation of a clause allowing the transfer of
know-how to a third party is desirable and justified, it is
necessary to determine whether the supplier will have the right
to participate in the new transaction or in payments emerging
therefrom. One possibility would be to recognize such a right, for
in its absence, the supplier will tend to ask for a higher initial
overall price, which could cover any further re-transfer executed
by the recipient. If this alternative is excluded, the contract might
simply state that the recipient will have the right to transfer part
or all of the secret technical information received from the sup-
plier to other parties in the receiving country. Such parties will be
subject to confidentiality obligations equivalent to those provided
for in the agreement.
Finally, a further limitation on the scope of confidentiality
obligations should be specified with regard to certain pieces of in-
formation which were known by the recipient at the time of their
transfer, or which were subsequently obtained from sources other
than the supplier. A possible formulation for this reservation
could be:
The recipient will keep confidential all technical information
transferred by the supplier and specifically indicated by him as
being of a secret character. This provision shall not apply to:
1) technical information which is in possession of the recipient
at the time of its transfer under this agreement; and
2) technical information independently obtained by the recipient
from sources other than the supplier.
3. Duration
The question of the duration of confidentiality obligations
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presents controversial opinions and varying practices. Technology
suppliers generally tend to ask for an indefinite duration, at least
as long as the technology retains its secret character. This also
seems to be the prevailing policy in developed countries. 123 In
many developing countries (and Spain), however, there is a trend
to limit the duration of such obligations to a specified period,
which, in certain cases, does not exceed the lifetime of the agree-
ment or a reasonable term after its expiration.2 "
In Mexico, for example, the National Registry's policy apparently
has been to limit the obligation of secrecy to a maximum of ten
years. However, this policy has been successfully challenged in
the courts by affected parties, which have obtained the enforce-
ment of indefinite confidentiality obligations.'25 In Brazil, legisla-
tion stipulates that an agreement for the transfer of technology
cannot contain a clause which "impedes the free utilization of
technology after an adjudged reasonable lapse of time from the
last transmission of information.""lK Similarly, the Group of 77
draft for an International Code on Conduct of Transfer of
Technology states that the agreements shall be subject to
respect for the confidentiality .. .of any trade secrets, secret
know-how and all other confidential information received from
the other party in connection with the transfer of technology,
provided that this obligation shall not extend beyond an ade-
quate lapse of time after the transmission of each item of secret
information .... 12
Usually, technology recipients that have paid for the disclosure
of a secret knowledge in order to attain a competitive advantage
in their own markets are just as interested in retaining the
secrecy of transferred technologies as the supplier. However,
from the perspective of a recipient developing country, there is
likely to be an interest in disseminating information and ex-
perience as widely as possible in order to expand the technological
capacity and the alternatives of industries in the country. The
1 See Wise & Seyler, supra note 57, at 2.
14 A notable exception to this trend is Argentine law 21617, which provides that con-
fidentiality obligations "may exceed the duration of the agreement." Id art. 8(d) (1977).
" See Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 85, at 582, wherein the author criticizes the inter-
pretation of the courts.
12 Normative Act No. 15 art. 4.5.2(d)(vi) of Sept. 11, 1975 (Brazil); INSTITUTO PARA LA IN-
TEGRACION DE AMERICA LATINA, RtGIMEN DE LA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECNOLOGIA EN LOS
PAISES DE AMIkRICA LATINA (1977).
12 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, art. 5.4(4),
U.N.Doc. TD/CODE TOT/24 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 773, 787 (1980).
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problem and its resolution consists in reaching an adequate
balance between these conflicting interests.
A good first step would be the elimination of indefinite duration
confidentiality obligations. This may be accomplished by requiring
a specific term stipulated in the agreement. The parties, and even-
tually the intervening competent body of the receiving country,
should evaluate the progress in the industrial sector and the likely
term of usefulness of the transferred know-how. A beneficial sec-
ond step would be to admit that such an obligation should last for
the lifetime of the agreement, or for a reasonable period
thereafter in cases justified by the nature, novelty, and value of
the technology concerned.
C. Use of the technology after the expiration of the agreement
A restriction on the use of know-how after the expiration of the
agreement is one of the most frequent and detrimental practices
in technology transfer transactions. It has been identified in
34.1% of a sample of agreements registered in Mexico,' in 63.1%
of contracts reviewed in Ecuador,'" and in 31.4% of agreements
considered by the Comit6 de Regalias of Colombia.13 This restric-
tion ranks among the five most frequent restrictive practices
indentified in such countries' and has been prohibited or other-
wise controlled under various statutes in Latin America' and
Spain.' In India, the government also does not approve of any
provision providing restrictions on use after the expiration of the
agreement. Wherever patents continue to be valid after expira-
tion, the agreement is generally allowed to be extended on
renegotiated terms.'3'
Under United States law, in conformity with the thesis on the
proprietary nature of know-how, clauses prohibiting the use of
trade secrets after the contract terminates are valid and en-
forceable. There is authority which states that, even absent such a
clause, the recipient must cease using the trade secrets after that
1 SISTEMA ECONOMICO LATINO-AMERICANO (SELA), RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN
THE IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA (1978).
129 Idj
131 Id
" See Correa, supra note 72, at 349. Under the law on transfer of technology enacted in
Argentina in 1977 (No. 21617), however, restrictions on use after expiration apparently are
deemed to be valid. See G. CABANELLAS, supra note 116, at 356.
' See G. CABANELLAS, supra note 116, at 356.
, See R. Singh & M. Finnegan, supra note 118, at 5.
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date.1" Such an implied obligation also seems to be valid in some
European countries, such as West Germany, Belgium, Denmark,
and Switzerland."'
The EC Commission has taken a position that represents a com-
promise between the two approaches presented above. In
Kabelmetal-Luchaire (1975), the Commission held that (the
licensee's) "undertaking to pay royalties after the contract expires
for secret technology . . . did not violate Article 85(1), since this
obligation did not prevent the licensee from using the know-how
after the contract has expired, even if it has to pay royalties to do
so." 187 Further, in the draft proposal for a block exemption regula-
tion for patent license agreements, the Commission has viewed a
post-contractual non-use clause as an article 85(1) violation. In the
1979 version of the draft, article 3(10) excludes from exemption
a clause prohibiting the licensee from using, after the expiry of
the agreement, secret manufacturing processes or other secret
know-how communicated by the licensor; this is without pre-
judice to any right of the licensor to require payments for the
use of such processes or know-how for an appropriate period,
even after the expiry of the agreement but subject to paragraph
4(d) of this article.
It is interesting to note that, in previous drafts, the Commission
stated that further payments could extend "for a period of not
more than three years from the expiry of the agreement."'" This
time limit has disappeared from the last draft.
It is possible to conclude that there is a clear and positive trend
in some developing countries and in the EEC toward the prohibi-
tion of post-termination non-use clauses. They are undoubtedly in-
valid in light of the notion that know-how is not a property right,
and that agreements on know-how do not transmit any right to it,
but consist of the disclosure of knowledge subject to a monopoly
of fact.
Therefore, without prejudice to the necessary regulatory action
in this area, potential technology recipients and competent na-
tional authorities should refuse any limitation on post-termination
use and, further, should require inclusion in the agreement text of
" See Wise & Seyler, supra note 57, at 4.
Is I&.
'" Id. at 1.
Im 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 16 (1979).
10 EUR. COMM. Doc. No. IV/262/77-E (1977).
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specific clauses recognizing the right of the recipient to continue
in the use of know-how after the contract's expiration. A possible
formulation would be:
Nothing in this agreement will be interpreted as preventing the
recipient to continue in the use of technical information received
from the supplier, after the expiration of the agreement as pro-
vided for in ....
The extent of the recipient's right to continue using transferred
information after the expiration of the agreement must be
qualified in several respects. First of all, the right clearly refers to
unpatented technology, and does not encompass knowledge under
patent protection. Second, the analysis on this matter generally
proceeds on the implicit assumption -which is also pertinent
here-that the "expiration of the agreement" is the date that the
parties have agreed upon for the usual termination of their
reciprocal obligations. It would be necessary to examine further
the effects of other anticipated forms of termination of the agree-
ment, either by mutual decision of the parties, by unilateral
revocation based on the other party's default, or by force majeure.
In this regard, it is important to consider, as a basis of the
analysis, that the continued use of the transferred know-how is to
be deemed the normal effect of agreements for the communication
of know-how.
A third qualification is that the freedom to use the know-how is
not incompatible with the existence of confidentiality obligations,
which may exceed, for a reasonable and definite period, the
lifetime of the agreement. Finally, the right to re-transfer know-
how to third parties should be recognized. If a confidentiality
obligation exists beyond the date of expiration, the transfer
should take place under similar conditions of secrecy.
D. Field of use restrictions
It may be useful to consider the enforceability of field of use
restrictions in the particular context of know-how agreements.
Under American law, according to Cawthra,
the owner of the know-how, like the owner of the patent, has the
exclusive right to the use of his recent technology. He may exer-
cise that right in such time, place and manner as he may choose.
So long as the know-how remains secret, the owner may license
its use to others and place restrictions on the method, place or
time of such use without fear of violating the anti-trust laws. He
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may not, however, place such restrictions on products made
from the know-how. This is because the grant of the know-how,
like the grant of a patent license, is a partial release of his
monopoly position rather than the imposition of an additional
restraint upon trade and commerce in the products made by the
use of know-how. 140
This position has received considerable criticism from the view of
the antitrust sector. The general tendency of antitrust authorities
in the United States is to treat know-how more strictly than
patents.'' As expressed by the Antitrust Guide for International
Operations: "Because know-how licensing lacks the protections
and legislative mandate of the patent system, however, know-how
licenses will in general be subject to antitrust standards which, if
anything, are stricter than those applied to patent licenses."'" 2
Moreover, Justice Department officials have taken the position
that field of use restrictions on manufacturing licensees will "be
challenged when they appear to be used to allocate or divide
markets""' (for instance, an agreement between two dominant
electrical firms whereby one licenses the other in the field of
motors over one horsepower and reserves to itself the field of
motors under one horsepower").
Further, the EEC Commission has taken a view against the
validity of field of use restrictions (in light of article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome)' 5 with regard to the communication of know-how.
Article 3(11) of the draft proposal (1979 version) for a block exemp-
tion regulation considers, in effect, that article 85(1) may be in-
fringed by
a restriction on the licensee against using secret manufacturing
processes or other secret know-how communicated by the licen-
sor except for specified purposes; without prejudice to any right
of the licensor to require payments at an appropriately higher
rate for any use. by the licensee not covered by the agreement
and not protected by patents of the licensor.'46
,, B. CAWTHRA, supra note 1, at 145.
11 Id. at 140.
'0 DivISION OF ANTITRUST, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 33-34 (1977).
", Address of R. Stern and R. McLaren, reprinted in Control of Restrictive Practices in
Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/17, 93, n.86 (1978).
144 Id.
145 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, Belgium-
Federal Republic of Germany - France - Italy - Luxembourg- Netherlands, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
" 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 16 (1979).
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It is worthwhile to note that the concept of "at an appropriately
higher rate" has been substituted for the notion "corresponding
increase in royalties" used in the 1976 preliminary draft of the
Commission."' Although the latter formulation established that
the supplier is entitled to payments for a use not specified in the
agreement, it did not require that such payment be "higher" than
that originally provided. This change can only be interpreted as a
concession to those who have criticized the solution proposed by
the Commission.
In accordance with the nature of agreements on know-how as
analyzed in this study, field of use restrictions in know-how trans-
actions are not justified. The supplier has no legitimate right to
prevent the recipient from using the received know-how in fields
that may be outside the field encompassed in the initial agreement.
The preceding consideration does not mean that contractual
conditions agreed upon on the basis of a certain use of know-how
should necessarily apply, without any change, to situations where
the recipient gives the know-how new uses not provided for in the
agreement. No change or adaptation in contractual terms will be
required when, for instance, the obligation of the supplier was
fulfilled entirely with the mere communication of know-how,
against payment by the recipient of a lump-sum. But whenever
the supplier has granted guarantees with respect to the use of
know-how for certain purposes and the price has been fixed accord-
ingly on the basis of royalties on production or sales, it will be
necessary to determine to what extent the terms agreed upon can
be enlarged for the new application of know-how. If a royalty pay-
ment is to be recognized on production related to a new use, the
royalty rate should be, at least, no higher than the rate originally
established. There is no convincing reason for the EEC proposi-
tion that royalties should be higher than before."8
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Available data on developed countries indicate that trade in
know-how constitutes a major component of transfer of tech-
nology transactions. Likewise, data on Latin American countries
suggest that the relative significance of know-how in transfer of
technology to such countries is greater than in developed coun-
tries, and, moreover, that it is growing over time.
147 I
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One of the primary characteristics of agreements involving
know-how in developing countries seems to be its transfer as a
part of a global package. It is likely that a significant part of
technologies transferred to developing countries has become
publicly known. Potential parties should take into consideration
the different nature and character of technical information. involv-
ed when unpackaging technology transfer transactions. This
precaution will ensure adequate differentiation of the legal treat-
ment applicable to each category of information.
The definition of know-how is a most complex and controversial
issue. On the one hand, the expression "know-how" has had limited
acceptance in legislatures and among jurisprudes. On the other
hand, there is substantial disagreement among commentators
with regard to the content and character of know-how, particular-
ly whether it involves only secret knowledge, excluding that
already divulged. Whether it should be limited to industrial infor-
mation or include knowledge of a nonindustrial nature is uncertain
as well.
The formulation of a concept of know-how suitable to the condi-
tions prevailing in developing countries must consider the limited
local innovation and dependence upon foreign technologies. For
the purposes of this study, know-how is defined as the method of
manufacture of the technical knowledge relating to the use and
application of industrial technology. This definition is broad as to
the types of techniques covered, whether secret or not, but ex-
cludes information of a non-industrial or commercial nature.
Without demeaning the merits of this or other definitions, the ex-
treme ambiguity of the expression examined makes it advisable to
avoid its use in contractual relations.
An analysis of the legal nature of know-how is essential to com-
prehend the issues and to identify the implications of various
theories on the legal treatment of agreements for its transfer. The
proprietary nature thesis of know-how is supported by the majority
of United States authorities. However, this concept must be inter-
preted in the specific context of American common law, where
courts can recognize new forms of property. The concept of "prop-
erty" is understood in a far more flexible and elastic manner in
the United States than under continental law. An important cor-
ollary of this concept is thit agreements for the transfer of know-
how constitute a mere "lease" of the proprietor's rights and that
the recipient is not entitled to continue using received know-how
after the agreement's expiration. Notwithstanding the specificity
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of principles of law and the premises upon which this thesis is
grounded, there is an attempt to obtain international recognition
through its acceptance in the International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology. However, such a position is incompatible
with the property principle of numerus clausus, which governs in
countries with codified civil law. Such a theory is also clearly in-
adequate in light of developing countries' conditions and needs.
Alternately, the theory of "immaterial goods" cannot justify the
existence of a specific legal protection for know-how to the extent
that such a protection has not been instituted by law. The present
legal status of know-how in civil law countries (France, Italy, and
many in Latin America) can be described adequately through the
concept of a monopoly of fact, according to which know-how is
deprived of specific legal recognition, without prejudice to the in-
direct protection on secret knowledge that may be granted under
unfair competition law and lawful contractual obligations.
Agreements for the transfer of know-how cannot be described
as "license" agreements because the supplier lacks an exclusive
right over it. In substance, such agreements are characterized by
the communication of knowledge. The disclosure of information is
the raison d'tre of the agreement and of the recipient's con-
sideration. Agreements for the communication of know-how can
be viewed as essentially consisting of the supplier's obligation to
perform all actions needed for the effective transfer and im-
plementation of technical information.
In principle, agreements on patentable (but not patented) inven-
tions, as well as inventions on which the patentability has been ex-
cluded by law, should be deemed valid and enforceable. However,
with regard to agreements on public know-how, it is necessary to
distinguish on the basis of the extent of divulgence of know-how:
if the information is generally available, the validity of a transfer
agreement is doubtful and contestable, except when formalized as
a "technical assistance agreement" whereby the supplier is re-
munerated on the basis of services effectively supplied. If the
technical information to be transferred represents access to a new
technology in the receiving country, the legislature of this country
should not exclude, in principle, the validity of agreements involv-
ing such transfer without prejudice to the determination of ap-
propriate limitations to confidentiality and other obligations.
In accordance with the analysis undertaken in this study, it is
possible to suggest certain proposals de lege ferenda and guide-
lines for the negotation and drafting of agreements for the com-
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munciation of know-how. Inter alia, these agreements should:
a) clearly state that the disclosure of secret know-how is deem-
ed the basis for the recipient's obligations;
b) include a statement by the supplier on the secret nature of
know-how to be transferred;
c) stipulate the effect of disclosure of the know-how on the
validity of the agreement, including termination where the
know-how has lost its secret character through no act of the
recipient;
d) specify the items of information to be deemed confidential;
e) determine the scope of expressly specified confidentiality
obligations with regard to 1) the disclosure of know-how for pur-
poses of subcontracting, procurement, etc.; 2) the disclosure to'
third parties (re-transfer) under similar obligations of confiden-
tiality; and 3) the exclusion from such obligations of knowledge
in possession of or independently obtained by the recipient;
f) determine the duration of confidentiality obligations, which
should not extend, in principle, beyond the lifetime of the agree-
ment or a reasonable period thereafter;
g) explicitly state the right of the recipient to continue in the
use of transferred know-how, after the expiration of the agree-
ment;
h) authorize the use of know-how by the recipient in any possi-
ble field of application, without prejudice to corresponding pay-
ment obligations emerging from uses not specifically agreed
upon; and
i) include provisions on applicable law, taking into account the
effects that the application of different national laws may have
on the qualification of know-how and on the conditions for its
use.
If these and similar guidelines are applied in agreements relating
to the communication of know-how, the position of developing
countries and of individuals and firms within them will be substan-
tially enhanced.
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